This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for wages lower than the one adequate for their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine this willingness and how it changes along the individuals' unemployment spells. The main results are: (i) Young workers, less educated and those living in regions or times of high unemployment are more willing to accept reduced wages while married women with a working husband are much less willing to do so; (ii) Once the individual fixed effect is controlled for, the willingness to work for reduced wages increases with the duration of unemployment; (iii) Not having access to unemployment benefits increases the probability that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept reduced wages.
Introduction
According to the standard job search theory, longer unemployment duration entails an increasing probability of accepting job offers. This theoretical prediction, however, is suspected in a country like Spain, where the unemployment rate has been exceptionally high and the proportion of long-term unemployed has been around 50% for a prolonged period. The persistence of high unemployment in Spain has drawn much attention among policy makers and economists. Some studies have emphasized insufficient job creation from the labor demand side resulting in high structural unemployment (Bentolila and Blanchard, 1990) , and others have pointed out the lack of worker mobility or other rigidities on the labor supply side (Blanchard et al., 1995 or Ahn, de la Rica and Ugidos, 1999). In Ahn et al. (1999) it is shown that the willingness to move for work is not sensitive to workers' unemployment duration, suggesting the lack of worker mobility as one of the underlying causes of Spanish unemployment problem.
There is a large literature on the unemployment duration in Spain (See, among others, Ahn and Ugidos (1995) , Cebrián et al. (1996) , Bover et al. (1997) or García-Pérez (1997) ). However, in all these papers we cannot distinguish the effect of reservation wages from those of the other elements of a search model. To understand better the problem of unemployment it is useful to know the determinants of workers' reservation wage. In this paper we examine the worker's flexibility in terms of the reservation wage. We highlight how unemployed workers' willingness to work for a reduced wage changes with the duration of unemployment. The extent of unemployed workers' flexibility with respect to their reservation wage has important policy implications since many policy measures regarding unemployment (such as changes in unemployment benefit generosity) aim at reducing workers' reservation wage.
The variable studied in this paper is the willingness to work for a reduced wage, which can be considered as a reduced-form variable which reflects the worker's reservation wage. Therefore, according to the standard job search theory, the willingness to work for a reduced wage should increase with the duration of unemployment, given other things constant along the unemployment spell, since reservation wages decrease with unemployment duration. 1 We will examine which personal and economic characteristics affect the willingness and how it evolves along the unemployment spell. Main findings are that young, less educated and those living in times or regions of high unemployment are more willing to accept a reduced wage. With respect to unemployment duration, we find that, once controlled for fixed individual heterogeneity, workers become more willing to work for a reduced wage as their unemployment spells lengthen. We also find that unemployment benefit receipt decreases the probability that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept reduced wages.
We organize the paper as follows. First, we discuss the main theoretical predictions which are relevant to the willingness to work for a reduced wage. Second, we describe the data used in our analysis and in the fourth section we present the empirical results. In this section, we start by analyzing the determinants of the willingness using cross-section data and then follow with an analysis using longitudinal data. In the analysis of longitudinal data we control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and the resulting endogeneity of unemployment benefit status. We highlight the factors which affect individuals to change their attitude along their unemployment spells by estimating the hazard rate that initially unwilling workers become willing to work for a reduced wage. The last section presents the main conclusions of our analysis.
Theoretical background
First of all, it is important to describe clearly our variable of analysis. The survey question we analyze is, when translated literally, "Are you willing to accept a job offer with a wage inferior to the one adequate for your qualification?" The answer to this question may be interpreted as a reduced-form variable related to the reservation wage. Formally, we may write this willingness using the reservation wage, w R (t), and the adequate wage for qualification, w a (t). The answer to the above question will be yes if w R (t) < w a (t), and no otherwise, where t denotes unemployment duration.
In order to understand better this question we consider a standard nonstationary search model. 2 This model deals with the optimal stopping decision an unemployed worker has to take when searching for a job. It assumes that unemployed workers will accept any offer if its associated wage is equal to or higher than their reservation wage. If the environment in which the worker is searching is non-stationary, that is, if individual or market situation changes over time, his reservation wage will also change over time. For example, if income or job offer frequency decreases with unemployment duration, the reservation wage will decrease as well (see Van den Berg, 1990 or García-Pérez, 2001). Therefore, these models provide us with a theoretical relationship between the duration of unemployment and reservation wages: given other things equal, the probability of observing w R (t) < w a (t) increases with unemployment duration because the reservation wage decreases. With respect to w a (t), it seems reasonable to assume that this is related with the average wage received by workers with similar characteristics. If this average offered wage were not affected by unemployment duration, we should expect greater willingness to work for a reduced wage the longer one remains unemployed. However, some factors, such as skill depreciation during unemployment, could make workers adjust downward their w a (t) as their unemployment spells lengthen. Final effects will depend on the magnitude of each of these factors.
Reservation wages depend on the unemployed worker's liquidity constraints and her expectations about future job offers, as well as search costs. Liquidity constraints depend on unemployment benefits and savings or accumulated assets (empirical evidence is shown in Stancanelli, 1999) . The greater non-labor financial resources one possesses, less likely is the worker to accept a job offer with a reduced wage. Those with greater family responsibilities are likely to have lower reservation wages, and therefore more willing to accept reduced wage offers. The composition of the household and each household member's situation, such as the presence of young children and the numbers of working or unemployed members, are also likely to be relevant factors. Also relevant are individual preferences for work, which are not observed but may be captured by certain individual characteristics such as age, education and the place of residence.
Reservation wages are also affected by the extent of human capital lost during unemployment spells. Those who face more rapid skill depreciation while unemployed will be more willing to accept a reduced wage offer. In this respect, occupation and educational level might be relevant variables. The current economic situation and expectations about future economic conditions also affect one's willingness to accept a reduced wage. For example, during a period of recession, when offers arrive less frequently, job offers are more likely to be accepted than during a period of expansion.
Finally, the willingness to work for a reduced wage will also depend on how one's future career and wage prospects are affected by current wage levels or employment status. It is likely that a low current wage may affect future wage prospects negatively if it operates as a negative signal to employers. This effect may be stronger among the occupations of high skill and high education, thus making workers with these characteristics less willing to work for a reduced wage.
Data and variables
The data used in this study are taken from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA) which is the main source of labor market information in Spain. This survey is undertaken each quarter on about 60,000 households (about 200,000 individuals). One-sixth of the sample is replaced by new households each quarter. Therefore, a household, once chosen, is interviewed up to six times over an interval of about 18 months.
In the first part of our analysis where we examine the determinants of the willingness to work for a reduced wage, we use pooled cross-section data over the 17 quarters between 1992:1 and 1996:1. In the second part of the analysis where we examine the relationship between the willingness and unemployment duration, we construct individual longitudinal data from the EPA's rotating panel from 1992:1 to 1997:2. The individuals who were interviewed for the first time in the first quarter of 1992 had their last interview in the second quarter of 1993 and similarly, the last cohort of our sample was interviewed from the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 1997. 3 Thus, we cover in our data set the last recession of the Spanish economy and the beginning of the following expansionary period.
We restrict our sample to those workers whose unemployment duration at the time of the first interview is shorter than four months, mainly in order to reduce the potential unobserved heterogeneity bias that could be contained in the different unemployment duration observed at the start of interviews, that is, the problem of left-censoring.
In our sample about 70% of responses to the willingness question were affirmative, 20% negative and 10% indecisive. A first look at the responses over time suggests that the willingness to work for a reduced wage is countercyclical: during recessions unemployed workers are more willing to accept lower wages than during the periods of expansion. 4 The dependent variable for the second part of the study is the changes in the willingness and the unemployment duration, in quarters, until initially unwilling workers become willing to work for a reduced wage. That is, we estimate the hazard rate of changes in the attitude from negative to positive.
Empirical results

Determinants of the willingness to work for a reduced wage
In a reduced-form empirical context, the willingness to work for a reduced wage can be specified as a latent variable representing the difference between the reservation wage and the adequate wage for the worker's qualification, w R (t) − w a (t), and can be considered as a function of some explanatory variables which are supposed to affect either wage. However, what we really observe is a discrete outcome y, where, in our case, y = 1 if an individual is willing to work for a reduced wage and y = 0 otherwise. Assuming the extreme value distribution of the error term in the specification of this variable, we can estimate a logit model on it. 5 Table 1 presents the results of this estimation. (Table 1) In this table we have the sample mean of each explanatory variable, estimated odds ratios (exponential of estimated coefficient) and asymptotic t−ratios of parameter estimates. The odds ratios are interpreted as the relative probability corresponding to a unit increase in each continuous covariate and the probability of each category relative to the omitted category for categorical covariates. The model is estimated separately for men and women to allow differential effects of explanatory variables by gender. We now discuss some important results.
Family Characteristics: We have included a variable representing whether the individual is the head of household, and for non-heads also the head's employment status. Among married men there were very few whose wife is registered as the head of household and therefore, these men are included in the head category. The results show no significant effect among men, whereas for women those with an employed husband appear to be much less willing to work for reduced wages than other women. This suggests that wives with an employed husband would have higher reservation wages than those with an unemployed or inactive husband. Other household characteristics, such as household size, the number of household members in each labor market status and the number of children of different ages in the family show no appreciable effects.
Age and Education Level: As expected, young people (aged [16] [17] [18] [19] are more willing to work for lower wages and those aged between 45 and 65 are much less willing to accept a reduced wage. The result for the teens contrasts with their lower willingness to move for work found in Ahn et. al. (1999) . This seems to suggest that the teens have lower reservation wages but face higher moving costs as many of them live in their parents' house. The downward inflexibility of reservation wages among old workers might reflect greater economic wealth or smaller human capital loss due to a shorter remaining working life.
The effect of education is strong. More educated workers are much less willing to work for lower wages. Again, this result contrasts with the result found in Ahn et. al. (1999) . Workers with high levels of education show higher geographical mobility but lower flexibility in terms of wages. This may reflect the labor demand situation, that is, it is harder to find a job for low-educated workers, and that signaling effects (a lower wage as lower ability) are stronger in the job market for high educated workers.
Unemployment Benefits: Theory predicts lower willingness among those receiving benefits than among non-receivers. However, although unemployment benefits show some negative effects on the willingness to work for lower wages, the effect is not very significant. This leads us to suspect the existence of unobserved characteristics, such as experience, skill or sector, which may be correlated with both the willingness and unemployment benefit status.
Local Labor Market Conditions: As expected, the local unemployment rate affects positively workers' willingness to work for lower wages. 6 Those living in a location with higher unemployment are more willing to work for lower wages. However, the local vacancy rate and real wages do not show any significant effects. 7 In summary, the results show that some individual characteristics, such as age and education, affect significantly the workers' willingness to accept a reduced wage offer. On the other hand, unemployment benefits reduce only marginally the willingness. This somewhat unexpected result may be due to unobserved heterogeneity which cannot be controlled in cross-sectional data.
In the next section we use longitudinal data to control for such heterogeneity.
Effects of unemployment duration on the willingness to work for a reduced wage
In Spain, where the proportion of long-term unemployed has been above or close to 50% during the past two decades, one of the most interesting factors one can consider in examining the willingness to work for lower wages is the duration of unemployment spells. Lengthening unemployment duration may 6 These local unemployment rates refers to the region or Comunidad Autónoma of the worker. 7 Data for vacancies and wages are from Official Statistics (See Ahn et al., 1999) affect both the reservation wage, w R (t), and the perceived adequate wage for given qualification, w a (t). As a worker stays unemployed longer, she is more likely to have exhausted unemployment benefits as well as other income sources. This will lower the worker's reservation wage, and therefore increase the willingness to accept a reduced wage. On the other hand, the perceived adequate wage, w a (t), could also be adjusted downward as unemployment spells lengthen due to, for example, the worker's skill depreciation. Hence, it is not clear how the duration of unemployment would affect the willingness to work for reduced wages. First, we examine the relationship between the willingness and unemployment duration using cross-section data. Table 2a shows a bivariate tabulation between unemployment duration and the willingness indicator obtained from the cross-section Spanish Labor Force Survey for 1992-1996. The result indicates no variation in the willingness by unemployment duration. This leads us to suspect the existence of uncontrolled heterogeneity among unemployed workers by unemployment duration which affects both the willingness and the duration. That is, the long-term unemployed might be systematically different from the short-term unemployed. Now, using a longitudinal data set, we control for unobserved individual fixed effects to obtain more accurate effects of unemployment duration on the willingness to work for lower wages. In the Spanish Labor Force Survey individuals are interviewed six times (every three months over a period of one and a half years), allowing us to examine unemployed workers' willingness as their unemployment duration lengthens. For example, for those who are unemployed for two consecutive quarters, we can examine the variation of the willingness as their unemployment duration increases by three months. For the group of people who are unemployed over the entire interview period (six quarters), we can examine how the willingness changes as the duration of unemployment increases by about 15 months (time elapsed between the first and the sixth interview). Table 2b shows how the willingness to work for a reduced wage changes as the duration of unemployment spells increases. All individuals in the sample were unemployed for up to 3 months at the time of their first interview. We divide the sample into subgroups, each of them in a different column, according to the period when individuals become employed or go out of the labor force, including a group of workers who stay unemployed over the entire time period of six interviews.
( Table 2a and 2b) One conclusion which can be drawn from Table 2b is that the willingness indeed increases with unemployment duration. For example, an increase by three months in the spell's duration raises the proportion willing to work for lower wages by about 2 percentage points. The largest increase is observed among those who are unemployed during all 6 quarters interviewed (last column of Table 2b ). The proportion of workers willing to work for lower wages increases from 64 percent to 80 percent over a 15 months interval, a quarterly increase by about 3 percentage points. This result contrasts to the insensitive willingness to move for work over unemployment spells, as found in Ahn et al. (1999) . Spanish workers appear to be more flexible in terms of wages than in terms of geographical residential move.
Further insight can be obtained from the transition matrix shown in Table  3 . It appears that there is a strong persistence in individuals' attitude. The persistence is particularly strong among those with a positive attitude: those who show a positive attitude in one period are very likely (about 94%) to show the same attitude in the following one. However, we observe a significant probability of changing attitude from negative to positive. In our sample about 22 percent of the unemployed workers with a negative attitude changed it to positive over an interval of three months. These patterns are consistent with a theoretical prediction that the worker's reservation wages are likely to decrease with the duration of unemployment. Finally, about 6% of workers in the sample changes their attitude from positive to negative. Most of this type of attitude change appear to occur when other unemployed workers in the household find a job, or when the worker begins to receive unemployment benefits after a period of no benefit mainly due to administrative delay.
( Table 3) One can think of many factors that can contribute to changing individuals' attitudes over time. As stated before, with lengthening unemployment duration people might run out of economic resources, which makes them more willing to work for lower wages. One variable that is available for our analysis is individual status regarding unemployment benefits each quarter. We observe whether or not unemployed workers received unemployment benefits at the time of each interview. The exhaustion of unemployment benefits is likely to lead to a sudden (although anticipated) drop in financial resources, and is likely to increase individuals' willingness to work for reduced wages. 8 Comparing the attitude of those who exhaust their unemployment benefits at some point between two periods with those who continue receiving them, we can examine the importance of economic means in workers' willingness to work for lower wages. A bivariate comparison of the proportions changing their attitude from negative to positive between two consecutive quarters by the unemployment benefit status shows virtually no difference (23% among those who receive benefits in both quarters and 24% among those who exhaust them between the two quarters). This result warrants a multivariate analysis.
Our sample consists of those workers who begin their unemployment spell unwilling (negative attitude) to work for a reduced wage. We estimate the hazard rate for the duration until that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept a reduced wage, conditional on continuing unemployed. The sample consists of two types of observations: complete and censored spells. Complete spells are the unemployed workers who change their answer from negative to positive during the subsequent unemployed periods observed in the survey, while the censored observations are those who have not changed their attitude during the observed unemployment spell. The sample characteristics are presented in Table 4 . There is a high percentage of censoring, which is due to four different reasons: finding a job (33.2%) or leaving the labor force (26.3%) while having a negative attitude, changing it from negative to indecision (10.2%) or no response to the question (10.2%).
( Table 4) The method of estimation is based on discrete-time duration models (see Lancaster, 1990 ). The reasons for using discrete-time techniques are not only that the data are observed in discrete intervals, namely in quarters, but also that these techniques are more flexible in estimating the time-dependence of the hazard rate (see Meyer, 1990) . We estimate the hazard rate for the duration, T R , until initially unwilling unemployed workers become willing to work for reduced wages. The variable of our main interest, unemployment benefits, is likely to be endogenous since some unobserved factors such as family income (in determining non-contributory unemployment benefits) and benefit entitlement duration (in determining contributory unemployment benefits) are also important determinants of the willingness to work for a reduced wage. To account for this endogeneity we estimate the unemployment benefit status jointly with the hazard rate. Unobserved heterogeneity is further accounted for by including a two-point mass distribution function as suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) . The hazard rate is the following conditional probability, using a normal distribution for its estimation:
where, b(t, η) is the binary indicator of whether the individual receives unemployment benefits in period t or not, x(t) is a vector of, possibly, time-varying variables and η is unobserved heterogeneity. The γ i (t) are time-varying parameters. The benefit status, b(t, η) depends on some explanatory variables as well as unobserved heterogeneity. 9 Once the likelihood function is accordingly written, one can estimate the model using maximum likelihood techniques. 10 In Table 5 , we have the estimation results of this hazard rate and of the process for the benefit status. The first interesting finding is that those individuals with unemployment benefits 11 are much less likely to change their attitude from negative to positive (see Figure 1 ). This result contrasts to the insignificant effect obtained in the analysis of the cross-section data in an earlier section.
( Table 5 ) With respect to other explanatory variables, we find a large effect of education: better educated workers are less likely to change their attitude from negative to positive. However, the interaction of this variable with duration is positive and significant, thus reversing the effect over time: those with high education are less willing to accept lower wages in the beginning of unemployment spells (up to about 9 months) but more willing thereafter than those with lower education (see Figure 2 ). The effect of age is similar to that of education but less strong and less significant: in the beginning of unemployment spells younger workers have a lower probability of changing attitude, but as the spells lengthen they are more likely to do so than older workers.
The only household characteristic which shows a significant effect is whether the spouse works or not: those whose spouse is working have a much lower probability of changing attitude and this result does not change by gender, which contrasts with the result of the previous analysis with the pooled cross-section data.
Another interesting result is the strong negative duration dependence in the hazard rate in spite of the inclusion of many variables which are supposed to capture individual heterogeneity. 12 Moreover, the control for unobserved heterogeneity has no effect on this duration dependence which is estimated 9 We have allowed for a differential effect of unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard rate and the process for benefits but the results are basically the same that when imposing that the effect is the same in both processes. 10 A discrete-time duration hazard rate can be treated as a sequence of binary choice equations (with cross-equation restrictions) defined on the surviving population at each duration. See Jenkins (1995) for a clear explanation of these techniques. 11 The unemployment benefit indicator is comparing workers receiving such benefits with those without them. The last group is composed of workers without access to unemployment benefits in the whole unemployment spell and those whose benefits have exhausted before the corresponding period. 12 The time dependence of the hazard rate is estimated here with dummy variables (Dur2, ...), one for each possible duration, the duration of one quarter being absorbed in the constant term.
to be very significant. The contrary is obtained for the mass points in the unobserved heterogeneity distribution: they are estimated to be not different form zero at usual significance levels. Hence, for the mean values of all the explanatory variables, we obtain a predicted hazard which decreases by more than 10 percentage points through the five quarters studied. This result may be related to the recent theoretical debate of whether there exists stigma or skill depreciation effects in explaining the empirical findings of a decreasing exit rate from unemployment with unemployment duration. 13 The relevance to our problem is that if only stigma effects were present (a longer unemployment spell signalling a bad quality), the reservation wage, but not w a , would be adjusted downward with lengthening unemployment. Therefore, the probability of changing the attitude to positive increases with unemployment duration. On the other hand, if skill depreciation effects were also present, the perceived adequate wage, w a , would also be adjusted downwards. Hence, depending on the magnitude of both effects, the probability of changing the attitude will decrease or increase. This may be the driving force in our results above: skill depreciation is high during unemployment so that the perceived adequate wage decreases as fast as their reservation wage, and, therefore, the probability of attitude change decreases with unemployment duration. However, we have to remember that this hazard rate is not just the probability of answering yes but this probability conditional on not having answered yes before. Moreover, what this strong negative duration dependence suggests is that those who begin their unemployment spells with a negative attitude are increasingly less likely to change their attitude over their unemployment spells. This result could be suggesting that reservation wages decrease more rapidly at the beginning of the spell than later.
Finally, we also obtain a higher probability of attitude change from negative to positive during the periods of recession or in regions where the unemployment rate is higher.
In summary, the results give some support to the hypotheses derived from the standard job search theory, in particular, the negative effects of unemployment benefits and the economic situation, and the positive effects of the local unemployment rate.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined unemployed workers' expressed willingness to accept a job offer with a reduced wage, and its relationship with unemployment duration in Spain. According to job search models, reservation wages decrease as unemployment spells lengthen. Therefore, one should observe unemployed workers becoming more willing to accept reduced wages as their spells become longer.
First, we analyzed which personal and economic characteristics determine the willingness to work for a reduced wage using pooled cross-section data. The main results are that young workers, those with low levels of education and those living in regions with high unemployment rates are more likely to show a positive attitude toward accepting lower wages while the college educated and married women with a working husband are substantially more likely to show a negative attitude. In the analysis of cross-section data, unemployment benefits show no significant effects and neither the unemployment duration. This suggests the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the cross-section data. When we use longitudinal data, indeed, the proportion of workers who are willing to accept an offer with a reduced wage increases with unemployment duration.
In the second part, we studied the duration until one changes her attitude from negative to positive by using a discrete-time duration model. The main result is that the access to unemployment benefits indeed shows significant negative effects in the transition probability for become willing to work for reduced wages. We also obtain that the effect of other important characteristics like gender, education or age have a changing pattern depending on the duration of the unemployment spell.
Our results suggest that economic variables such as unemployment benefits can affect unemployed workers' reservation wage, and therefore the exit rates from unemployment. Therefore, the generosity of unemployment benefits could be an effective policy instrument in the Spanish labor market. Moreover, we have found that some workers have more rigid attitudes towards accepting lower wages, that is, they have larger reservation wages. These workers are young and the more educated, specially at the beginning of their unemployment spell, and those with the spouse working. Low Educ.
